Two-Person Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information
- Bibliography of Bargaining Experiments.
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Linhard, and R. Radner , "Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory , 48, Loewenstein, George F. Malouf, M.
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Marwell, Gerald and David R. Mnookin, Robert et al. Murnighan, J.
Bibliography of Bargaining Experiments
Neale, Margaret A. Nydegger, Rudy V. Ochs, J. Osborne, Martin J. Prasnikar, Vesna, and Roth, Alvin E. Prasnikar, V. Rapoport, Amnon, Ido Erev, and Rami Zwick , "An experimental study of buyer-seller negotiation with one-sided incomplete information and time discounting," Management Science , forthcoming.
Rapoport, Amnon, James A. Sundali, and Richard E.
A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
Sundali, and Darryl A. Seale , "Ultimatums in two-person bargaining with one-sided uncertainty: Demand games," J. Roth, A. Roth, Alvin E. Roth, ed.
Tietz, ed. Salop, Steven C. Schelling, Thomas C. Selten, Reinhard , "Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eigeschrankt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments," in Beitrage zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung , H. Sauermann, editor, J.
Becker and R. Richter, editors, Tubingen, J. Shogren, Jason F. Siegel, Sidney and Lawrence E.
Table of Contents
Slonim, R. Straub, Paul G. Suleiman, Ramzi , Expectations and fairness in a modified Ultimatum game," Journal of Economic Psychology, 17, Thaler, Richard H. Principals' own social preferences are not an important determinant of their behavior. However, when the principals make contract offers, they anticipate that social preferences affect agents' behavior. FEHR, E. Datenverarbeitung HART, O. HOLT, C.
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